Referenced in our Newsletter Volume 4, Issue 2 - April 2005
Wire Transfers for Alien Smuggling
The amount of data reported by financial institutions is increasing every year as more filing requirements and
compliancy laws are being enacted to help combat financial crimes and money laundering activities, especially
those involving terrorist financing. The focus this month returns to the SAR-MSB (Suspicious Activity Report -
Money Service Business) where a high-value SUBJECT is identified in making false representations regarding her
identify when transferring money (via wire transfers).
As with many proactive criminal investigations, the exact nature of the pattern is not entirely known
beforehand and often, only becomes clear once we see the entire picture. In this particular case, the
indicators used to identify a well-qualified starting point were derived using the Network Miner service
in VisuaLinks. The system was configured to show all networks using the linkage between
SUBJECTS and ID NUMBERS where the total network size exceeded 10 nodes. As is presented in the
following table, the top entry in this list shows a single ID NUMBER being utilized by 12 different SUBJECTS.
Although there are other, larger networks generated by the Network Miner, it was decided to review only
heavily utilized ID NUMBERS to expose intentional misrepresentation.
The first step in this process was to select the targeted network and regenerate it in the VisuaLinks display.
The diagram shown below represents the results returned. For security purposes, any specific details have
been hidden, removed, or changed in this example - but the structural integrity of the diagram has not been
altered in any way. The 12 SUBJECTS connected to this single ID NUMBER are all variations of the same name.
The last name (not shown) clearly represents the same individual; however, the number of different variations
of how her name was spelled resulted in this specific network configuration.
At this point, it is not entirely clear if the name variations are intentional or due to the way in which
this name can be interpreted (it is Spanish in origin). One thing that is positively known from this diagram
is that there will be a minimum of 12 SAR-MSB transactions used to support these connections, and perhaps more.
Thus, we have a potential target based on a large filing frequency.
From here, the network is expanded one level using the Database Walk feature provided in VisuaLinks.
The next diagram shows the individual SAR-MSBs associated with each SUBJECT depicting a total of $115,450
dollars transacted over a 4 month period of time. Close observation also indicates that there were two
transactions that occurred on 08/19/2003. Due to the fact that there are exactly 12 SAR-MSBs, it starts to
become evident that this individual may be trying to misrepresent herself to avoid detection because it
would be highly unlikely for the same financial institution to misrepresent her name wrong 12 different times.
The network is expanded a third level to bring in the corresponding ADDRESSES. As shown in the next diagram,
there are some common ADDRESSES that are shown [the common ADDRESSES connect together two or more SUBJECTS].
Each ADDRESS icon in the display represents a completely different location. In this situation, the SUBJECT
has listed multiple addresses throughout the Phoenix, Arizona region. Again, we must question why there are
eight distinct and unique addresses listed for this person in such a short period of time.
The next diagram introduces the four Social Security Numbers (SSNs) for the SUBJECT. The largest connected
SSN has been used in eight of the transactions. A close examination of the other three SSNs indicates they
are entirely different numbers and do not reflect any type of transposition of numbers, which is often seen
when multiple SSNs are connected to the same SUBJECT.
Finally, the PHONE numbers are presented showing nine unique numbers. Using the HTTP Search feature supported
by VisuaLinks, each number is checked against the Google White Pages and none come back with any additional
information. Thus, these PHONE numbers are most likely made-up or non-existent. Based on the overall structure
and representation of this network, it can be concluded that intentional misrepresentation is occurring for this
SUBJECT.
In fact, the NARRATIVES for many of these SAR-MSBS explicitly state this SUBJECT is using multiple ADDRESSES or
SSNS or PHONES. Several of the NARRATIVES indicate she comes in "several times a day" to conduct transactions and
each time provides a different ADDRESS, PHONE, or SSN. All of the transactions are in-bound which means she is
receiving money sent by other people. Closer review of the NARRATIVES reveals the senders are located in different
parts of the United States and the amounts are between $1,500 and $3,500. This most likely represents some type of
enterprise involved with illegal alien smuggling - because they are one-time payments being made by multiple people
across the country.
For additional VAI material and coverage of the SAR-MSB data and various smuggling examples, please review these
previous newsletter entries:
Issue 8 - August 2004 - Suspicious SAR-MSB Filing Data
Issue 10 - October 2003 - Compliance Analysis
Issue 5 - May 2003 - Detecting Financial Crimes
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